A New Angle on L2 Regularization by Tanay, Thomas & Griffin, Lewis D
A New Angle on L2 Regularization
(interactive version available at https://thomas-tanay.github.io/post--L2-regularization/)
Thomas Tanay Lewis D Griffin
CoMPLEX, UCL CoMPLEX, UCL
Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to the
adversarial example phenomenon: all models tested so far can have their
classifications dramatically altered by small image perturbations [1, 2].
The following predictions were for instance made by a state-of-the-art
network trained to recognize celebrities [3]:
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This result is puzzling for two reasons. First, it challenges a common
belief according to which good generalization to novel data and
robustness to small perturbations go hand in hand. Second, it constitutes
a potential threat to real-world applications [4–6]. Researchers at MIT
have for instance recently constructed 3D objects that are misclassified
under a wide distribution of angles and viewpoints [7]. Understanding
this phenomenon and improving deep networks’ robustness has thus
become an important research objective.
Several approaches have been explored already. The phenomenon has
been described in detail [8, 9] and some theoretical analysis has been
provided [10–12]. Attempts have been made at designing more robust
architectures [13–16] or at detecting adversarial examples during
evaluation [17–20]. Adversarial training has also been introduced as a
new regularization technique penalising adversarial directions [2, 21–23].
Unfortunately, the problem remains largely unresolved [24, 25].
Confronted with this difficulty, we propose to proceed from fundamentals:
focusing on linear classification first and then increasing complexity
incrementally.
A Toy Problem
In linear classification, adversarial perturbations are often understood as
a property of the dot product in high dimension. A widespread intuition
is that: “for high dimensional problems, we can make many infinitesimal
changes to the input that add up to one large change to the output” [2].
Here, we challenge this intuition and argue instead that adversarial
examples exist when the classification boundary lies close to the data
manifold—independently of the image space dimension.1
Setup
Let’s start with a minimal toy problem: a two-dimensional image space
where each image is a function of a and b.
1This idea was originally inspired by the work of Marron et al. [26] on the data piling
phenomenon affecting SVMs on high-dimensional low sample size data.
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In this simple image space, we define two classes of images...
...which can be separated by an infinite number of linear classifiers.
Consider for instance the line Lθ.
This raises a first question: if all the linear classifiers Lθ separate I and J
equally well, are they all equally robust to image perturbations?
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Projected and mirror images
Consider an image x in class I. The closest image classified in the
opposite class is the projected image of x on Lθ:
When x and xp are very close to each other, we say that xp is an
adversarial example of x. Observe though that xp is classified with a low
confidence score (it lies on the boundary) and it is perhaps more
interesting to consider high-confidence adversarial examples [25].
In the following, we focus on the mirror image of x through Lθ:
By construction, x and xm are at the same distance from the boundary
and are classified with the same confidence level.
A mirror image as a function of θ
Coming back to our toy problem, we can now plot an image x and its
mirror image xm as a function of θ.
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We see that the distance between x and xm depends on the angle θ. The
two borderline cases are of particular interest.
This raises a second question: if adversarial examples exist when Lθ is
strongly tilted, what makes Lθ tilt in practice?
Overfitting and L2 regularization
Our working hypothesis is that the classification boundary defined by
standard linear learning algorithms tilts by overfitting noisy data points
in the training set. This hypothesis is supported by the theoretical result
of Xu et al. [27] relating robustness to regularization in Support Vector
Machines (SVM). It can also be tested experimentally: techniques
designed to reduce overfitting such as L2 regularization are expected to
mitigate the adversarial example phenomenon.
Consider for instance a training set containing one noisy data point p.
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If we train an SVM or a logistic regression model on this training set, we
observe two possible behaviours.
At this point, one might legitimately wonder—what does a 1-dimensional
data manifold lying in a 2-dimensional image space have to do with
high-dimensional natural images?
Adversarial Examples in Linear Classification
In the following, we show that the two main ideas introduced in the
previous toy problem stay valid in the general case: adversarial examples
exist when the classification boundary lies close to the data manifold and
L2 regularization controls the tilting angle of the boundary.
Scaling the Loss Function
Let’s start with a simple observation: during training, the norm of the
weight vector acts as a scaling parameter on the loss function.
Setup
Let I and J be two classes of images and C a hyperplane boundary
defining a linear classifier in Rd. C is specified by a normal weight vector
w and a bias b. For an image x in Rd, we call raw score of x through C
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the value:
s(x) := w·x + b
The raw score can be seen as a signed distance between x and the
classification boundary defined by C. In particular:
x is classified in
∣∣∣∣∣ I if s(x) ≤ 0J if s(x) ≥ 0
Now, consider a training set T of n pairs (x, y) where x is an image and
y = {−1 if x ∈ I | 1 if x ∈ J} is its label. We are interested in the
distributions of the following quantities over T :
This leads to the notion of empirical risk R(w, b) for the classifier C
defined as the average penalty over the training set T :
R(w, b) :=
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈T
f
(
y s(x)
)
In general, learning a linear classifier consists of finding a weight vector w
and a bias b minimising R(w, b) for a well chosen loss function f .
In binary classification, three notable loss functions are:
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With the 0-1 indicator function, the empirical risk is simply the error rate
on T . In a sense, this is the optimal loss function as minimizing the error
rate is often the desired objective in practice. Unfortunately, it is
incompatible with gradient descent (there is no gradient to descend: the
derivative is null everywhere).
This limitation is overcome in the hinge loss (used in SVM) and the
softplus loss (used in logistic regression) by replacing the unit penalty on
the misclassified data with a strictly decreasing penalty. Note that both
the hinge loss and the softplus loss also penalize some correctly classified
data in the neighbourhood of the boundary, effectively enforcing a safety
margin.
The scaling parameter ‖w‖
An important point previously overlooked is that the signed distance s(x)
is scaled by the norm of the weight vector. If d(x) is the actual signed
Euclidean distance between x and C, we have:
d(x) := wˆ·x + b′ where wˆ := w‖w‖ b′ := b‖w‖
and s(x) = ‖w‖ d(x)
Hence, the norm ‖w‖ can be interpreted as a scaling parameter for the
loss function in the expression of the empirical risk:
Let us define the scaled loss function f‖w‖ : z → f(‖w‖ × z).
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We observe that the 0-1 indicator function is invariant to rescaling while
the hinge loss and the softplus loss are strongly affected.
Remarkably, the hinge loss and the softplus loss behave in the same way
for extreme values of the scaling parameter.
More precisely, both losses satisfy:2
f‖w‖
(
y d(x)
) ≈
‖w‖→+∞
‖w‖ max (−y d(x), 0)
For convenience, we name the set of misclassified data:
M := {(x, y) ∈ T | y d(x) ≤ 0}
and we can then write the empirical risk as:
R(w, b) ≈
‖w‖→+∞
‖w‖
(
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈M
(− y d(x))
)
2 Hinge loss
max(1− ‖w‖ y d(x), 0) = ‖w‖ max (‖w‖−1 − y d(x), 0)
≈
‖w‖→+∞
‖w‖ max (−y d(x), 0)
Softplus loss
ln
(
1 + e−‖w‖ y d(x)
)
≈
‖w‖→+∞
−‖w‖ y d(x) if y d(x) ≤ 00 if y d(x) > 0
≈
‖w‖→+∞
‖w‖ max (−y d(x), 0)
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This expression contains a term which we call the error distance:
derr :=
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈M
(− y d(x))
It is positive and can be interpreted as the average distance by which each
training sample is misclassified by C (with a null contribution for the
correctly classified data). It is related—although not exactly
equivalent—to the training error.3
Finally we have:
minimize: R(w, b) ⇐⇒
‖w‖→+∞
minimize: derr
In words, when ‖w‖ is large, minimizing the empirical risk for the hinge
loss or the softplus loss is equivalent to minimizing the error distance,
which is similar to minimizing the error rate on the training set.
More precisely, both losses satisfy:4
f‖w‖
(
y d(x)
) ≈
‖w‖ →0
α− β ‖w‖ y d(x)
for some positive values α and β.
We can then write the empirical risk as:
R(w, b) ≈
‖w‖ →0
α− β ‖w‖
(
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈T
y d(x)
)
3A small error distance derr does not guarantee the training error errtrain to be small.
In the worst case, when all the data lies on the boundary, derr = 0 and errtrain = 100%.
4 Hinge loss
max(1− ‖w‖ y d(x), 0) =
‖w‖ →0
1− ‖w‖ y d(x)
α = 1 and β = 1
Softplus loss
ln
(
1 + e−‖w‖ y d(x)
)
≈
‖w‖ →0
ln(2)− 1
2
‖w‖ y d(x)
α = ln(2) and β =
1
2
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This expression contains a term which we call the adversarial distance:
dadv :=
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈T
y d(x)
It is the mean distance between the images in T and the classification
boundary C (with a negative contribution for the misclassified images). It
can be viewed as a measure of robustness to adversarial perturbations:
when dadv is high, the number of misclassified images is limited and the
correctly classified images are far from C.
Finally we have:
minimize: R(w, b) ⇐⇒
‖w‖→0
maximize: dadv
In words, when ‖w‖ is small, minimizing the empirical risk for the hinge
loss or the softplus loss is equivalent to maximizing the adversarial
distance, which can be interpreted as minimizing the phenomenon of
adversarial examples.
Closing remarks
In practice, the value of ‖w‖ can be controlled by adding a regularization
term to the empirical risk, yielding the regularized loss :
A small regularization parameter λ lets ‖w‖ grow unchecked while a
larger λ encourages ‖w‖ to shrink.
Adversarial Distance and Tilting Angle
The adversarial distance emerged in the previous section as a measure of
robustness to adversarial perturbations. Rather conveniently, it can be
expressed as a function of a single parameter: the angle between the
classification boundary and the nearest centroid classifier.
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If TI and TJ are the restrictions of T to the elements in I and J
respectively, we can write:
dadv =
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈T
y d(x)
=
1
n
[ ∑
x∈TI
(−wˆ·x− b′) +
∑
x∈TJ
(wˆ·x + b′)
]
If TI and TJ are balanced (n = 2nI = 2nJ):
dadv = − 1
2nI
∑
x∈TI
wˆ·x + 1
2nJ
∑
x∈TJ
wˆ·x
=
1
2
wˆ·
[(
1
nJ
∑
x∈TJ
x
)
−
(
1
nI
∑
x∈TI
x
)]
If i and j are the centroids of TI and TJ respectively:
dadv =
1
2
wˆ·(j − i)
We now introduce the nearest centroid classifier, which has unit normal
vector zˆ = (j − i)/‖j − i‖:
dadv =
1
2
‖j − i‖ wˆ·zˆ
Finally, we call the plane containing wˆ and zˆ the tilting plane of C and
we we call the angle θ between wˆ and zˆ the tilting angle of C:
dadv =
1
2
‖j − i‖ cos(θ)
This equation can be interpreted geometrically in the tilting plane:
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On a given training set T where the distance between the two centroids
‖j − i‖ is fixed, dadv depends only on the tilting angle θ. Two
observations follow:
• The adversarial example phenomenon is minimized by the nearest
centroid classifier (θ = 0).5
• Adversarial examples can be arbitrarily strong when θ → pi/2
(as was the case with the classifier Lθ in the toy problem section).
Example: SVM on MNIST
We now illustrate the previous considerations on binary classification of
MNIST digits. For each possible pair of digit classes, we train multiple
SVM models (w, b) for a regularization parameter λ ∈ [10−1, 107] using a
training set of 3000 images per class.6
We start by plotting the distributions of the distances y d(x) between the
training data and the boundary as a function of the regularization
parameter λ (grey histograms). We superimpose the loss function f‖w‖ as
scaled after the convergence of each model (blue line).
5...and the classifiers parallel to it: dadv is independent of the bias b. This explains
why the models defined by SVM are poorly adjusted when regularization is high, result-
ing in very high training and test errors (see for instance the classification of 1s vs 8s
when λ = 107 in the next section).
6More precisely, we train for each pair of digit classes 81 models with a regularization
parameter λ = 10α with α ranging from −1 to 7 by steps of 0.1.
13
We see that the scaling of the hinge loss has a clear influence on the
model obtained. Unfortunately, minimising the training error and
maximizing the adversarial distance are conflicting goals: errtrain is
minimized when λ is small and dadv is maximized when λ is large. Note
that the test error is minimized for an intermediate level of regularization
λoptimal. When λ < λoptimal, the classifier is overfitted and when
λ > λoptimal, the classifier is underfitted.
To get a better understanding of how the two objectives are balanced, we
can look at the training data under a different point of view. We first
compute the unit weight vector zˆ of the nearest centroid classifier. Then
for each SVM model (w, b), we compute the unit vector nˆ such that
(zˆ, nˆ) is an orthonormal basis of the tilting plane of w.7 Finally, we
project the training data in (zˆ, nˆ):
The horizontal direction passes through the two centroids and the vertical
direction is chosen such that w belongs to the plane (the hyperplane
boundary then appears as a line). Remark also that since (zˆ, nˆ) is an
orthonormal basis, the distances in this plane are actual pixel distances.
To understand why the data points appear to be moving around when λ
varies, one needs to imagine the tilting plane rotating around zˆ in the
784-dimensional input space (thus showing a different section of the
784-dimensional training data for each value of λ).
7We do this by using the Gram-Schmidt process:
nˆ =
n
‖n‖ with n = w − (w·zˆ) zˆ
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For high regularization levels, the model is parallel to the nearest centroid
classifier and the adversarial distance is maximized. As λ decreases, the
classification boundary improves its fit of the training data by tilting
towards directions of low variance. Eventually, a small number of
misclassified training samples is overfitted, resulting in a very small
adversarial distance and a weight vector that is hard to interpret.
Finally, we can look at two representative images x, y (one per class) and
their mirror images xm, ym for each model. Their projections in the
tilting plane of w give a very intuitive picture of the adversarial example
phenomenon in linear classification:
The model is sensitive to strong adversarial examples (||xm − x|| → 0 and
||ym − y|| → 0) when the tilting angle approaches pi/2. This is a
symptom of strong overfitting, and whether it occurs or not depends on
the difficulty to separate the two classes (compare for instance the
classification of 7s versus 9s and the classification of 0s versus 1s).
Adversarial Examples in Neural Networks
Thanks to the equivalence between adversarial distance and tilting angle,
the linear case is simple enough to be visualized in the plane. In neural
networks however, the class boundary is not flat and the adversarial
distance cannot be reduced to a single parameter. Nonetheless, some
similarities with the linear case remain.
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First Step: a 2-Layer Binary Network
Let N be a 2-layer network with a single output defining a non-linear
binary classifier in Rd. The first layer of N is specified by a weight matrix
W1 and a bias vector b1 and the second layer of N is specified by a weight
vector W2 and bias b2. We assume that the two layers are separated by a
layer φ of rectified linear units applying the function z → max(0, z)
element-wise. For an image x in Rd, we call the raw score of x through N
the value:
s(x) := W2 φ(W1 x+ b1) + b2
Similarly to the linear case, the empirical risk on T for a loss function f
can be written:
R(W1, b1;W2, b2) :=
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈T
f
(
y s(x)
)
and training N consists in finding W1, b1, W2 and b2 minimizing R for a
well chosen f .
φ is piecewise linear and around each image x there is a local linear region
Lx within which:
φ(W1 x+ b1) = W
x
1 x+ b
x
1
where W x1 and b
x
1 are obtained by zeroing some lines in W1 and b1
respectively.8 Within Lx, the raw score can thus be written:
s(x) = W2W
x
1 x+W2b
x
1 + b2
This can be seen as the raw score of a local linear classifier Cx and our
analysis of the linear case then applies almost without modifications.
First, we observe that s(x) is a scaled distance. If d(x) is the actual
signed Euclidean distance between x and Cx, we have:
s(x) = ‖W2W x1 ‖ d(x)
The norm ‖W2W x1 ‖ can then be interpreted as a scaling parameter for the
loss function (the scaling is now local, dependent on x). One simple way
to control all the local scalings simultaneously is by adding an L2
regularization term to the empirical risk acting on the norms ‖W1‖ and
8More precisely, the ith lines in W x1 and b
x
1 are:
(W x1 , b
x
1)i =
(W1 , b1)i if (W1 x+ b1)i > 00 if (W1 x+ b1)i ≤ 0
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‖W2‖ independently (remember that the weights in W x1 are a subset of
the weights in W1). With gradient descent, this is equivalent to decaying
the weights W1 and W2 at every iteration. More precisely, for a learning
rate η and a decaying factor λ, the weight decay update is:
W1 ← W1 − η λW1 and W2 ← W2 − η λW2
• With a small decaying factor λ, the scaling parameter ‖W2W x1 ‖ is
allowed to grow unrestricted and the loss penalizes only the
misclassified data. Minimizing the empirical risk is then equivalent to
minimizing the error on the training set.
• As the decaying factor λ increases, the scaling parameter ‖W2W x1 ‖
decreases and the loss starts penalizing more and more of the correctly
classified data, pushing it further away from the boundary. Under this
light, L2 weight decay can be seen as a form of adversarial training.
Second Step: General Case
The previous analysis can be generalized to more layers and even to
non-piecewise-linear activation functions. The important observation is
that we always have:
s(x) = ‖∇x s‖ d(x)
Where ∇x s is the gradient of the raw score on x, and d(x) is a linear
approximation of the distance between x and the boundary defined by the
network. The norm ‖∇x s‖ then constitutes a scaling parameter for the
loss function which can be controlled with weight decay.
This idea can also be extended beyond binary classification. In the
multiclass case, the raw score becomes a vector whose elements are called
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the logits. Each logit si(x) is then transformed into a probability pi(x) by
applying the softmax function:
pi(x) := softmaxi(s(x)) :=
esi(x)∑
j
esj(x)
For an image/label pair (x, y), the probability associated with the correct
class is py(x). The log-likelihood loss function encourages it to come close
to 1 by attributing the following penalty to (x, y):
Now, varying weight decay influences the scaling of the logits, effectively
acting as a temperature parameter for the softmax function.9 When
weight decay is very low, the probability distributions generated are close
to one-hot encodings (py(x) ≈ 0 or 1) and only the misclassified data
produces non-zero penalties. With higher weight decay however, the
probability distributions generated become smoother and the correctly
classified data participates to the training, thus preventing overfitting.
In practice, a number of observations suggest that modern deep networks
are under-regularized:
1. They are often poorly calibrated and produce overconfident
predictions [29].
2. They often converge to zero training error, even on a random
labelling of the data [30].
3. They are often vulnerable to linear attacks of small magnitude [2].
9We can redefine the softmax function as:
softmaxi(s(x), t) :=
e
si(x)
t∑
j
e
sj(x)
t
where t is the temperature parameter. It was introduced in the context of network
distillation [28] and controls the softness of the softmax function.
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Example: LeNet on MNIST
Is it possible to regularize a neural network against adversarial examples
by only using weight decay? The idea is simple enough and has been
considered before: Goodfellow et al. [2] have observed that adversarial
training is ”somewhat similar to L1 regularization” in the linear case.
However, the authors reported that when training maxout networks on
MNIST, an L1 weight decay coefficient of 0.0025 ”was too large, and
caused the model to get stuck with over 5% error on the training set.
Smaller weight decay coefficients permitted successful training but
conferred no regularization benefit.” We put the idea to the test once
again and our observations are more nuanced. If using a high weight
decay is clearly not the panacea, we found that it does help reduce the
adversarial examples phenomenon, at least in simple setups.
Consider LeNet on MNIST (10-class problem). We use the baseline
MatConvNet [31] implementation with the following architecture:
We train one version of this network with a low weight decay of 10−4 and
one version with a high weight decay of 10−1 (we refer to the two versions
as LeNetlow and LeNethigh respectively). We keep all the other parameters
fixed: we train for 50 epochs, use a batch size of 300, a learning rate of
0.0005 and a momentum of 0.9.
We can make several observations. To start, let’s plot the training and
test errors for the two networks as a function of the epoch.
We see that LeNethigh is less overfitted (the train and test errors are
approximately equal at the end of the training) and performs slightly
better than LeNetlow (final test error of 1.2% versus 1.6%).
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We can also inspect the weights that have been learnt. Below, we
compute their root mean square value (RMS) and show a random
selection of filters for each convolutional layer.
As expected, the weights learnt with a higher weight decay have a much
lower RMS. The filters of LeNethigh are also smoother than the filters of
LeNetlow (see the presence of clean edge detectors in Conv1 and Conv2)
and their magnitudes vary more within each convolutional layer (see the
presence of uniformly gray filters in Conv2 and FC1).
Finally, let’s submit the two networks to the same visual evaluation: for a
random instance of each digit, we generate a high confidence adversarial
example targeted to perform a cyclic permutation of the labels 0→ 1,
1→ 2, ..., 9→ 0. Specifically, each adversarial example is generated by
performing gradient ascent on the probability of the desired label until
the median value of 0.95 is reached.10 We show below the 10 original
images OI with their corresponding adversarial examples AE and
adversarial perturbations Pert for the two networks.
10On each network, we set the temperature t of the softmax layer such that the median
classification score over the test set is 0.95. For a target label l, the gradient ∇x pl(x)
(computed by backpropagation) gives the direction of steepest ascent towards l. Here,
we generated each adversarial example x′ by iterating the following update rule:
x′ = clip[0,255]
(
x′ + 1.0× ∇x′ pl(x
′)
‖∇x′ pl(x′)‖
)
until pl(x
′) = 0.95.
20
We see that LeNethigh is less susceptible to adversarial examples than
LeNetlow : the adversarial perturbations have higher L2 norms and are
more meaningful for human observers.
Thoughts Moving Forward
Despite the widespread interest it has generated for several years now,
and despite its significance for the field of machine learning both in
theory and in practice, the adversarial example phenomenon has so far
retained much of its intrigue. Our main goal here was to provide a clear
and intuitive picture of the phenomenon in the linear case, hopefully
constituting a solid base from which to move forward. Incidentally, we
showed that L2 weight decay plays a more significant role than previously
suspected in a small neural net on MNIST.
Unfortunately, the story gets more complicated with deeper models on
more sophisticated datasets. In our experience, the more non-linear the
model becomes and the less weight decay seems to be able to help. This
limitation may be superficial and it is perhaps worth exploring the ideas
introduced here a bit further (for example, we should probably pay more
attention to the scaling of the logits during training). Or the high
non-linearity of deep networks might constitute a fundamental obstacle to
the type of first-order adversarial training that L2 regularization
implements. Our feeling is that a truly satisfying solution to the problem
will likely require profoundly new ideas in deep learning.
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